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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

J. R. BAGNALL, aka JOSEPH
BAGNALL, and FLORENCE
BAGNALL,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 13753

SUBURBIA LAND COMPANY, an
Idaho corporation, et. a l . ,
Defendants and
Counter-Appellants.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now the above named defendants-appellants, Suburbia
Land Company of Idaho, Nevada, and Utah, together with the defendantappellant Lester Romero, and move the Court for a rehearing of the above
entitled case by reason of e r r o r by the Supreme Court in overlooking and
misconstruing material facts and the status of defendants 1 briefs, basing
its decision on incorrect principles of law, overlooking seven critical issues
raised by the defendants, overlooking applicable decisions and misapplication
of law to the facts and status of the case, all of which materially affected the
resulting decision of the Court.

The following is a brief statement of the

points wherein the Supreme Court is believed to have erred in it r s decision
(see brief for additional details and explanations):
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT DEFENDANTS HAD
DESIGNATED ONLY THOSE PORTIONS O F THE RECORD FAVORABLE T O
THEMSELVES, AND THAT MUCH THAT WAS DESIGNATED WAS C O N T R O VERTED BY THE UNDESIGNATED PORTIONS.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS'
BRIEFS WERE LOADED WITH UNREFERENCED, SELF-SERVING STATEMENTS
OF FACTS AND CONTENTIONS AND THAT DEFENDANT E X P E C T E D THE
COURT T O CONDUCT THEIR RESEARCH.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESPOND T O THE FIRST
SIX POINTS RAISED BY DEFENDANTS WHICH POINTS ARE BASICALLY
POINTS OF LAW AS A P P L I E D T O UNCONTROVERTED MATTERS OF FACT.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESPOND T O THE SEVENTH
POINT RAISED BY THE DEFENDANTS WHICH POINT WAS A QUESTION OF
PROCEDURE AND HAD VERY L I T T L E IF ANYTHING T O DO WITH ANYTHING
CONTAINED IN THE TRIAL TESTIMONY.
POINT V
A P P E L L A N T S ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO A
WRITTEN DECISION RESOLVING EACH OF THE POINTS RAISED IN THEIR
A P P E A L B R I E F AND STATING THE REASONS FOR THAT DECISION.
W H E R E F O R E , appellants p r a y for a r e h e a r i n g of t h i s m a t t e r on
the m e r i t s and upon the grounds stated in appellants appeal brief and r e p l y
brief, and for an o r d e r r e v e r s i n g the judgment of the t r i a l court, r e i n s t a t i n g
the c o n t r a c t , and r e m a n d i n g the c a s e for further p r o c e e d i n g s consistent
therewith.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT L. LORD
118 Metro Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants
*
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IN T H E S U P R E M E COURT
O F TTTE S T A T E O F UTAH

J. R. B A G N A L L , t : . J - A ; S E P H
U A U N A L L , and F L O R E N C E
H/HJNALL,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
C a s e No.

vs.

PMTPI

SUBURBIA LAND C O M P A N Y , ;in
I d a h o c o r p o r a t i o n , r>. - 1
D e f e n d a n t s and
i ourriA-r-Appellants.

B R I E F AND AI T H O R i T I E S LP> S e P P O K T
O F MOTION FOR R E H E A R I N G

A P P E L L A M ' S

S T A T E M E N T O P N A T U R E O F T H E CASE
T h i s c a s e I n v o l v e s a n a c t i o n to forfei t a r e a l e s t a t e a g r e e m e n t f o r
aJ l e g e d f a i l u r e to m a k e t h e r e q u i r e d i n s t a l l m e n t • ;, . n 1 to

I(«IH

I iith

• > sonit?

5 70 a c r e s of l a n d i n t h e plai n t i f f s .
DISPOSITION" IN T H E L O W E ! ' c t ' ;yn
T h e C o u r t d e n i e d t h e d e f e n d a n t s 1 i n k i e r - -or j u d g m e n t on t h e
verdict,

, in t h e a l t e r n a t i v e .

of th"4 p l a i n t i f f s ,
w • ' s -o

":v ,i IU v, I r i n l ,

utel g r a n t e d jiuignit nl. m favor

.in.I a^viii-.* t h e d e f e n d a n t s f o r r e : t i n ^ the r e a l e s t a t e a g r e e m e n t

,

A*.

t r, 'Ti\"., y/hudi 1P'1 C o u r ! , by S u r : n - u ^ J u d g m e n t end D e c r e e of Quxci T i t U ,
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.)

awarded to United Paint and C o l o r s ,

Plaintiff's appeal froin +he S u m m a r y

Judgment and D e c r e e of Quiet Title is also pending before this honorable court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON A P P E A L
" • -svll- w - ' V-IV" l-iii1"1) "( s'-k .%-.-.

;

l -

- ,;•;-•

;

"

Forfeiture, and seek to ;:,vo judgment entered 1:1 then* lavor ^ I s m i s ^ m g the
con ip] aint of 1:1 le plai nti ff a nd rei nstati ng the coi 1 t r a c t.

Defendants further seek

an award and judgment for attorney fees and c o s t s , and to have the matter
remanded back to the I)i s t r i c I: Court foi " a d e t e r m i n a ti on of dan: 1a ges,

adjust-

m e n t s and offsets due defendants from the plain tiffs.

s rA rEMEN r c )i P ' \c rs
Appellants /.irorporaU 1 b\ r e f e r e n c e the /.iciiornent of ' a t r
containc a in ; :-.v origii:^; ;..:;,:

L.

pi;

M

.. ^ v:.*

-,*

:KM\\;\

HK*

as

Ja-:.no;i ^

the Court is ^pivnficaliy -lirc'ciua 10 ihe Appendix ^oiitaincJ in the i\ pi; hrief
which contains extensive r e f e r e n c e s to the r e c o r d in support of the facts as
stated therein.
The exceedingly complex nature of t h r legal and factual i s s u e s
involved in this c a s e m a k e s it difficult for counsel to c l e a r l y understand, a nc I
the w r i t e r can well a p p r e c i a t e the difficulty encountered by the m e m b e r s of the
Supreme Court in attempting to follow and understand the a r g u m e n t s of appellants
as contained in t h e i r origi nal and r e p l j briefs on file herei n.

It a p p e a r s , however,

that the Supreme Coi irt m i s u n d e r s t o o d the 1 latu ire of tl le points of e r r o r rel ief
upon by the appellants, and may v e r y well have overlooked appellants r e s t a t e m e n t
of facts which 1:,i ' as i ncluded i 11 the reply brief as an appendix.
ARGI fMENT
POINT I
Tl IE COURT ERRED !N CONCI /I JDINC, Til \ T DEFENDANTS HAD
Digitized by
the Howard PORTIONS
W. Hunter Law Library,
Law School, BYU.
DESIGNATED-ONLY
THOSE
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RECORD
FAVORABLE TO
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THEMSELVES, AND THAT MUCH THAT WAS DESIGNATED WAS CONTROVERTED
BY THE* UNDESIGNATED PORTIONS.
The decision of the Supreme Court herein, filed October 31, 1975,
stated that counsel for the defendants had designated only those parts of the
record favorable to defendants' position and that much of the designated portion
appeared to have been controverted as demonstrated by the trial court's written
findings.

The decision further stated that practically no references were made

to the record to substantiate the factual situation represented by counsel to have
existed. As is fully demonstrated in defendants 1 reply brief, the record before
the court is complete in all relevant particulars and fairly and accurately
reflects the missing testimony. As will be more fully explored below, defendants 1
briefs are fully referenced with over 239 citations to the record, exhibits, and
transcript.
It is evident that the Court based its decision upon its misapprehension of the state and condition of the record and of defendants* briefs as is
demonstrated by the following quotation from page one of the decision:
"As a result we have before us briefs of both sides loaded
with unreferenced, self-serving statements of facts and contentions, with an apparent invitation that we perform their
procedural obligations and conduct their research. We cannot
indulge them such luxury under the circumstances here. This
Court, therefore, under elementary principles anent appellate
review, in this particular case will presume the findings of the
Court to have been supported by admissible, competent, substantial evidence. H
As pointed out on page 4 of defendants 1 reply brief, the missing
portions of the oral testimony are insignificant when compared with the
voluminous amount of testimony actually brought before the Court.

The only

testimony not before the Court is the direct examination of J. R. Bagnall,
(every point covered in direct was carefully re-examined on cross); the direct
by the Howard
Law Library,direct,
J. Reuben Clark
Law School,
BYU.covered on direct
of Don V. Tibbs Digitized
(as with
J. R.W. Hunter
BagnalPs
every
point
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was re-covered in detail on cross); the testimony of LeLand Peterson (who
testified that he had not been an officer of Suburbia Land); the testimony of
John Brown (who testified as to the appraised value of the ranch); and some of
the cross of Reed Maxfield (the Court does have 68 pages of Maxfield's cross).
Except for the testimony of LeLand Peterson which may have some bearing
upon the credibility of Mr, Maxfield, none of the omitted testimony has anything
to add to that actually before the Court, and counsel has repeatedly stated, and
herein r e - s t a t e s , that the testimony as designated, and particularly as actually
before the Court accurately depicts the testimony of the participants at the trial.
How can the Court state that only part of the testimony favorable to the defendants
is before the Court, or that much of the testimony before the Court is controverted by the missing portions, without reading what is actually before them.
In the recent case of Nagle vs. Club Fontainbleu, 17 U. 2d. 125,
405 P. 2d. 346 (1965), the court made the following observation:
11

Only a partial transcript of the trial, containing exerpts
from the testimony has been brought here. Upon reading it we
perceive therein nothing which would compel a determination
contrary to that made by the trial court. n
The appellants Suburbia and Romereo maintain that the testimony
before the Court will compel a determination contrary to that made by the trial
court, and earnestly beg the Court to give due consideration to the arguments
contained in their briefs and the carefully review the evidence cited in support
thereof. If the Court does not do so, the effect of its ruling in this case can
only be to negate Rule 75 (e), and all appeals must, from this time foreward
include the entire record, thereby vastly increasing the expense to the litigants
and adding to the workload of this Court.
POINT II

THE
COURT
ERRED
THAT
THE DEFENDANTS'
Digitized
by the Howard
W. HunterIN
LawCONCLUDING
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law
School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

BRIEFS WERE LOADED WITH UNREFERENCED, SELF-SERVING STATEMENTS
OF FACTS AND CONTENTIONS AND THAT DEFENDANTS EXPECTED THE
COURT TO CONDUCT THEIR RESEARCH.
The undersigned writer is undoubtedly responsible for leading the
Court into e r r o r in this regard.

The statement of facts as contained in appellants 1

original appeal brief was admittedly not very well referenced.

Counsel can only

say that his attempt to set forth the facts was straight foreward and he assumed
that the statement as prepared would be accepted by plaintiffs.

If so, it would

have been, in essence, an abstract of much of the testimony as contemplated
by the rules. Even so, defendants 1 appeal brief contains at least 100 citations
to the record, exhibits, and testimony.

Most of them a r e admittedly contained

in the arguments rather than in the statement of facts.
When, however, plaintiffs challenged defendants' version of the
facts, the defendants reprinted that statement as an appendix to their reply brief.
Every fact was referenced by appropriate citation to the record, exhibits, or
oral testimony.

That restatement alone contains at least 87 references, with an

additional 52 included in the arguments. Between the appeal brief and the reply
brief, defendants have made over 239 references to the appropriate exhibits,
records, and testimony.

Counsel represents to the Court that over 100 man

hours were spent developing those citations alone. With such ample references,
counsel cannot understnad how the Court can make the assertion that defendants 1
brief is loaded with self-serving and unreferenced statements of facts and contentions.

Counsel asks the Court to reconsider its finding in this regard and to

give defendants' briefs and arguments the due consideration counsel believes
they deserve.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESPOND TO THE FIRST
SIX POINTS RAISED BY DEFENDANTS WHICH POINTS ARE BASICALLY POINTS
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
OF LAW AS APPLIED TO Machine-generated
UNCONTROVERTED
MATTERS OF FACT.
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1.

Point 1 of the appellants appeal brief lists 10 major defects in

the title to the land the sellers were supposed to deliver to the buyers.
Those defects consisted of the following:
(a) Encroachment of the railroad right of way.
(b) Encroachment of the county road.
(c) Loss of 1/2 interest in 140.15 acres, containing the bulk of
the improvements.
(d) Loss of the fee simple interest in . 57 acres containing the main
residence.
(e) Property in the name of seller's son J. A. Bagnall.
(f)

Private easements.

(g) Unreleased lis pendens.
(h) 1. 5 acres in the name of strangers Sharp and Hansen.
(i)

Outstanding oil and gas leases.

(j)

Failure to deposit water stock into escrow within the time

allowed by the contract, or at any time prior to the notice of default and commencement of suit.
In addition, sellers did not tender the abstract to the buyers at any
time, although required to complete the abstract by the t e r m s of the modification
agreement.

Except for the matter of the private easement, all of the foregoing

defects are uncontroverted.

In defense thereto, plaintiffs assert that buyers

represented that they had acquired all of the interest of the parties.

(See their

brief, page 18). The Supreme Court in rendering its decision herein, apparently
assumed that to be the fact.

On page 2 of the decision, the Court states that

Suburbia f s agent represented that it had acquired Jean B. Nyber's individually
claimed and acquired one-half interest in the 140.15 acre tract.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to be conceded that the buyers
had made
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a errors.
representation and that it wrmiH
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be controlling in the face of the representations to the contrary contained in the
modification agreement, and the warranties to the contrary contained in the
warranty deed on file with the escrow, the Court must still contend with the
trther 10 defects listed above, all of them being substantial and material.
As pointed out on page 15 of defendants' appeal brief, 57-1-3, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, states:
n

A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a
conveyance of real estate unless it appears from the conveyance
that a l e s s e r estate was intended. M
Bagnall's attempt to vary the meaning of their warranty deed, and
to vary the plain meaning of the modification agreement by parol should not be
allowed.

In the case of Van Cott vs. Jacklin, 226 P. 460 (Utah 1924) the Court

found that the warranties controlled even where the buyer knew that the vendor
did not own all of the ground conveyed.
In the case of Leavitt vs. Blohn, (1960), 11 Utah 2d. 220, 357 P. 2d.
190, discussed at some length in defendants' appeal brief, page 15 and 17, the
Court had occassion to determine the effect of the vendor's failure to perfect
his title before attempting to default the purchaser.

The Court stated that the

obligations in an installment land contract runs both ways and that the buyer
could not enforce his rights if he failed to make his payments.

M

By the same

token, if the seller fails to meet his commitment he likewise cannot expect the
buyer to perform.

fl

The Idaho Court in the case of Sorensen vs. Larue (1927),

252 P. 494, stated that the vendor must furnish good title as of the date required
by the contract, and failing to do so, even though the buyer was admittedly unable
to make the payments, the vendor could not default the vendee and bring suit for
foreclosure.

He had to tender performance as required by the contract before

he could default the vendee. And finally, in the case of Roberts vs. Braffett
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

(Utah 1907), 22 Utah 51, 92 Machine-generated
P. 789, the
Court
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OCR,
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fr

Where time is of the essence of a contract of sale of real
estate, but neither party exercised his right to declare an end
to the contract, the vendor cannot, when the stipulations of the
contract a r e mutual, dependent, and concurrent, legally placed
the other party in default until he himself had tendered performance
by tendered performance by tender of a deed, and accounting for the
purchase money. "
2.

Point II of appellants 1 brief makes two approaches to the matter

of the tender by defendants of all delinquencies.
the application of the law to uncontested facts.

The first is simply a matter of
Prior to the notice of default,

Reed R. Maxfield on behalf of Suburbia Land Company, made a tender ,fof any
and all amounts that are due J. R. Bagnall under the t e r m s of that certain real
estate contract dated September 1, 1962.!f (Exhibit P-15) This tender was r e jected (Exhibits P-16, P-18), and the full accelerated balance demanded (Exhibit
P-18). Again, on August 28, 1970, within the 30 days provided for in the notice
of default, tender was again made of f, all amounts actually due" under the contract,
(Exhibit P-32). None of the tenders, including the one of August 28, were accepted.
(See pre trial stipulation number 15) The appellants have argued at some length
on pages 23 to 31 of their appeal brief, that the tenders were good as a matter of
law, and they feel that the Court should respond to that arguement and give them
the reasons for any decision made thereon.

Even if no transcript at all had been

designated, this argument would still have to be decided by the Court.
Beginning on page 31 and continuing through page 35 of their appeal
brief, appellants second approach points out the reasons why the testimony and
weight of the evidence compel a finding that the tenders were good as a matter of
fact as well as a matter of law. Some of the more pertinent facts to be considered
by the Court are as follows:
(a) July 5, 1969, tender (Exhibit P-15) rejected by the Bagnalls.
(b) Maxfield had over $15, 000. 00 cash on hand to meet the tenders
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as of July 5, 1969 (T-330, 331), and the Clearfield State Bank had committed to
loan an additional $15, 000. 00 (Transcript book 1, p 232).
(c) Buyer's net worth of $100, 000. 00 (Tr. bk. 3, P. 49)
(d) Lester Ralph Romero had assets to back up the tender, was the
owner of a going business concern in Salt Lake City, and had on deposit, as of
October 23, 1969, a thrift certificate at Interlake Thrift for $10, 000. 00. (Tr. 365,
Exhibit D-46).
(e) August 28, 1970, buyers again tendered payment (Exhibit P-31).
Again vendors did not accept.
(f)

Romero had on deposit with Interlake Thrift, as of October 26,

1971, a thrift certificate for an additional $9, 000. 00. (exhibit D-47).
(g) September 27, 1972, defendants made a proffer of proof consisting
of $80, 000. 00 worth of certificates in the name of Romero antidating the tenders
of July 5, 1969, and of August 28, 1970. (See Judge Erickson f s Order of October
11, 1972).
Defendants position on the weight of the evidence is amply supported
by the testimony and exhibits before the Court. Hundreds of citations are given to
the record, transcript and exhibits which will sustain defendants position.
3.

Point III of the t r i a l brief is again mostly a matter of the applica-

tion of the law to uncontested facts.

Defendants contend that the plaintiffs waived

tender by refusing to give defendants an accounting, by rejecting their written
tenders, and by demanding the entire contract balance rather than just the delinquencies. Again, the record and the exhibits would seem to be sufficient to
decide this matter without the necessity of recourse to any oral testimony.

As

is pointed out in detail on pages 35 through 40 of the appeal brief, written tenders
were made by the vendees, and written rejections received from the vendors'
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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made by the vendors for the entire accelerated
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balance due under the contract.

They, of course, had no right to accelerate

since there was no acceleration clause in the agreements.
Recourse to the transcript of oral testimony, however, strengthens
the conclusion that Bagnalls had waived tender, and that, consequently, Suburbia
had no obligation to make a tender in any event.

Maxfield, J. R. Bagnall, and

Florence Bagnall all testified that within a few days of July 5, 1969, the Bagnalls,
upon advice of counsel, determined that they would not take anything less than
the improperly accelerated contract balance. (Tr. 108, 109, 166, and 299)
Maxfield and J. R. Bagnall both testified that Mrs. Bagnall told Maxfield that
they did not want the money, they wanted the land back.

Defendants believe that

the Court should have considered the legal and factual elements of their point III
and ruled specifically thereon.
4.

Point IV is a straightforeward legal arugment going only to the

question of the validity of the notice of default which admittedly asked for more
than twice the alleged default.

The Supreme Court in another case, has already

ruled on that specific issue and found that such a notice, demanding more than
was due, was defective and insufficient to effect a default under the contract.
(See the case of Wayne E. Carroll vs. Phil M. Birdsoll (1970), 24 U. 2d. 411,
472 P. 2d. 389.) In that case the notice demanded the alleged default, demanded
$475. 00 attorney fees, and demanded an increased monthly payment in the future
over and above the contracted payment.

The Court stated that the notice obviously

required the vendees to do more than could be required of them under the contract
and made the following observation and ruling:
"It is equally obvious that such a notice could not possibly
convert buyers into tenants at will, since it required the buyers
to do more than that for which the contract called, including
unascertained costs and pre-determined attorney's fees before
suit. "
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The Bagnall notice likewise reauired the buvprs to do RnTYiP+Viinc rvt-VtoT*

than in accordance with the t e r m s of the contract, namely to pay the accelerated
balance. And, similarly to Carrol vs. Birdsall, Bagnall demanded unspecified
interest.

It is equally obvious that Bagnalls ? notice could not possibly put the

defendants into defualt, or as stated by the Carrol vs. Birdsall court,

M

convert

buyers into tenants at will. " On this point of law alone, the judgment against
defendants should be reversed and the plaintiffs 1 complaint dismissed.
5.

Like many of the other arguments of defendants which were

overlooked by the Court, point five as contained in the appeal brief is, again, a
matter of law to be applied to basically undisputed facts. As is acknowledged by
all parties, a payment of $400. 00 was made by the defendants to the escrow on
December 1, 1971, which payment was regularly posted to interest, the escrow
fees deducted, and the balance forewarded to Bagnalls.

(Exhibit D-18).

Plaintiffs

refused the monies and returned them to the bank where they were deposited to a
checking account opened by Bagnall (Exhibit P-27). The legal affect of that
payment, the relationship of the bank as agent of either or both parties, its
responsibilities and their effect upon the parties, e t c . , are all discussed at
length in defendants' appeal brief on pages 47 through 53. These arguments do
not depend, for the most part, upon any oral testimony, and are therefore
subject to determination by the Court without resort to the transcript of oral
testimony.

To the extent that such testimony and exhibits are examined, however,

the Court is led inexorably to the conclusion that the bank was the agent of Bagnall
only, and that its acceptance of the payment for Bagnall was binding upon Bagnall
and therefore reinstated the contract.
6.

Point six explores the legal effect of the offer to pay the

entire contract balance into the registry of the Court, and the effect of the independant escrow set up by the defendants to back up the offer.
•*:•
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Again, this is

a matter of law, and does not involve any disputed facts.

It should, therefore,

be decided by the Court regardless of the alleged state of the record.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RESPOND TO THE SEVENTH
POINT RAISED BY THE DEFENDANTS WHICH POINT WAS A QUESTION OF
PROCEDURE AND HAD VERY LITTLE IF ANYTHING TO DO WITH ANYTHING
CONTAINED IN THE TRIAL TESTIMONY.
Point seven, set forth on pages 59 and 60 of the appeal brief discusses
a point of procedural e r r o r by the trial judge. As pointed out in the brief, the
p r e - t r i a l order and some of the determinations contained therein stand in direct
contradiction to the findings of fact ultimately entered by the Court.

Defendants

make the point that the p r e - t r i a l order should have been amended rather than
ignored.

This is a matter of law and could be ruled upon by the Supreme Court

on the basis of the order and the findings, without access to any other part of the
record.
POINT V
APPELLANTS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO A WRITTEN
DECISION RESOLVING EACH OF THE POINTS RAISED IN THEIR APPEAL BRIEF
STATING THE REASONS FOR THAT DECISION.
The opinion of the Supreme Court fails to consider the points raised
by the defendants in the original or reply brief, except for the supposed lack of
citation to the record, and the problems surrounding the 140.15 acres of Jean
Nyberg which was deeded to Utah Valley Land and ultimately to United Paint and
Colors, and then bases its entire decision upon its misapprehension of these two
facts.

The Supreme Court simply ignores defendants contentions that (a) the

plaintiffs 1 prior defaults prevent them from defaulting the defendants; (b) that
parol evidence should noi: be allowed to alter the effect of the warranties in the
warranty deed nor to alter the provision in the modification agreement to the effect
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defendants 1 tenders of the delinquencies are valid under the statute without proof
of ability to pay where, as here, the vendors rejected the tender and advised
the vendee that they would not accept anything less than the total contract balance;
(d) that vendors waived tender by their action in refusing anything less than the
total contract balance and by advising defendants that they did not want the money
in any event, that what they really wanted was the land back; (e) that plaintiffs 1
notice of default was fatally ambiguious and that the defendants could not determine
therefrom what was required of them to avoid default, or; (f) that the notice was
defective because it demanded performance other than that required by the contract;
(g) that by accepting money on the contract after notice of default the contract was
reinstated; (h) that the escrow was the agent for sellers only; (i) that the defendants
proffer of $80, 000. 00 worth of savings certificates antedating the tenders compelled
a finding for the defendants; (j) that the defendants offer to pay the entire contract
balance into the registry of the Court reinstated the contract; (k) that the t r i a l
Court should have amended the p r e - t r i a l order rather than to simply ignore it.
Rule 76 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads in part as follows:
11

... every decision of the court, together with the reasons therefore concisely

stated, shall be given in w r i t i n g . . . " Article VIII, Section 25, of the Constitution
of the State of Utah reads in part as follows:

!

^ h e n a judgment or decree is

reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court, the reasons therefore
shall be stated concisely in w r i t i n g . . . ! !
This case is a matter of great importance to all of the parties
involved, and involves a very valuable piece of real estate. Defendants believe
that a careful consideration of the points raised in their briefs will compel an
order reversing the t r i a l courts findings and dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint.
Defendants briefs, particularly when read together are replete with citation to
i
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the transcript, exhibits, and the record, and clearly set forth the legal and factual
matters to be determined by the Court.
Defendants a r e constitutionally entitled to a decision of the Court
responding to each of the issues raised by the defendants.

The writer also sincerely

believes that the legal issues raised by the defendants are ripe for determination
by this Court as precedent for later similar disputes. A more detailed decision
which considers the various legal issues raised by the defendants is clearly
appropriate and justifies rehearing of this matter.
CONCLUSION
To justify rehearing or modification of a decision of the Supreme
Court a strong case must be made that the Court has seriously erred, and that the
e r r o r materially affects the result.

(Cummings vs. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129

P. 619.) Matters justifying rehearing or modification of a decision include situations
where the Court has (a) misconstrued or overlooked some material fact, (b) has
overlooked some statute or decision, (c) has based the decision on some wrong
principle of law, (d) has misapplied or overlooked something which materially
affects the results, (e) has failed to correctly state the law, etc. (Beaver County vs
Home Indemnity Co., 88 Utah 1, 52 P. 2d. 435. Cummings vs. Nielson supra).

The

Court seriously erred in numerous areas and in numerous manners which matterially
affected the result of this case, as follows:
1. The Court concluded, apparently without reading the record or
defendants briefs, that the defendants had designated only those portions of the
record favorable to themselves and that much that was designated was controverted
by the undesignated portions. As discussed in detail above, the conclusion is not
justified.
2. The Court erred in concluding that it should affirm the decision of
•

.

•

,

,f.
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the trial court unless the entire record is before it. At this point the writer
wishes merely to restate the correct proposition that even with only a partial
transcript the Court must reverse if there is evidence before it which will compell
reversal.

Such compelling evidence has been pointed out by counsel and discussed

at great length in the appeal and reply briefs.
3. The Court erred in its finding that the defendants 1 briefs were
loaded with unreferenced and self-serving statements of facts and contentions.
With 239 citations to the transcript, exhibits, and record, it can hardly be said
that defendants' briefs were unreferenced.
4. The Court erred in failing to respond to defendants' contention
that the substantial and material prior defaults of the plaintiffs prevented them
from defaulting the defendants.
5. The Court erred in failing to find that parol evidence should not
be allowed to alter the meaning aiid effect of the unambiguous warranty deed, real
estate agreement, and modification agreement.
6. The Court erred in failing to rule upon defendants' contention
that the written tenders of all amounts due under the contract, coming before
notice of default, are valid as a matter of law, especially where, as here, plaintiffs
rejected the tenders, and told defendants that they would not accept anything less
than the total contract balance, and that they did not want the money, they wanted
the land back.
7. The Court erred by failing to rule upon defendants' contention
that the notice of default was fatally ambiguous and that it was otherwise defective
because it demanded more than was due under the contract.
8. The Court erred by failing to respond to the defendants' contention
that the escrow was the agent of the plaintiffs only.
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9. The Court erred by failing to determine the defendants' claim
that the payment of $400. 00 to the escrow after the notice of default, and the
acceptance thereof by the escrow constituted a waiver of the notice and reinstated
the contract.
10. The Court erred in failing to consider the effect of defendants 1
proffer of $80, 000. 00 worth of savings certificates, or to consider the defendants'
offer to pay the entire amount due on the contract, together with fees and costs,
into the registry of the Court.
11. That the p r e - t r i a l order should have been followed or amended,
rather than merely ignored is another contention of the defendants.

The Court's

failure to address itself to that proposition also constitutes e r r o r .
The writer apologizes to the Court for the length and complexity of
this brief, as well as the earlier ones. In an attempt to reduce the size hereof,
many references to the record which would otherwise be appropriate have been
omitted. All such required references are included in the appeal and reply
briefs on file however.

Defendants, through their counsel, also request the

court to grant them the opportunity for oral argument on this motion for rehearing.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT L. LORD
118 Metro Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant-Appellants
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing, postage
prepaid, this 26th day of December, 1975, to Jackson Howard, for Howard Lewis
& Peterson, attorneys for the plaintiff-respondents, 120 East 300 North, Provo,
Utah, 84601.
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